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HARRY HARDING 
American strategy in the Far East - or, as we are increasingly accustomed to 
calling it, East Asia or the Asia-Pacific region - is an extremely complex topic 
that is difficult to summarize in a balanced and comprehensive way in a brief 
lecture. 
The difficulty of the subject stems first of all from the complexity of the 
Asia-Pacific region. As commonly defined in the United States, East Asia 
includes more than thirty countries and regions, of diverse size, location, 
population, level of development, and political system. Geographically, the 
region extends from Siberia in the north to New Zealand in the south, and 
from Tibet in the west to Samoa in the east. In size, the nations of East Asia 
range from vast continental nations such as the Soviet Union, to large island 
archipelagos like Japan and Indonesia, to small city states such as Singapore. 
In population, they include both China, with its billion people, and the island 
nations of the South Pacific, with populations of only several thousands. The 
Asia-Pacific region comprises not only the postindustrial economy of Japan 
and the newly-industrialized economies of South Korea and Taiwan, but also 
dynamic exporters of primary products, such as Indonesia and Thailand, and 
some of the poorest nations in the world, including Laos and Burma. 
Politically, the countries of the region range from industrial democracies 
(such as Japan) to some of the most despotic totalitarian systems (such as 
North Korea), as well as quasi-democracies, military authoritarian systems, 
and even a few colonies (such as Hong Kong, Macao, and New Caledonia). 
In short, compared with Europe - or even with Africa or Latin America - East 
Asia is a more diverse and expansive region. Accordingly, American policy 
there must also be differentiated and complex. 
Secondly, the complexity of the subject of this lecture results from the fact 
that American policy toward the Asia-Pacific region is increasingly multi- 
dimensional. In the past, an assessment of American relations with East Asia 
could reasonably focus exclusively on matters of diplomacy, politics, and 
strategy, setting economic questions safely aside. Such an approach would be 
unthinkable today. Although there are still important political and strategic 
elements in American relations with the Asia-Pacific nations, economics has 
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increasingly come to occupy the highest position on the American agenda in 
the region. Indeed, it is now the most important issue in American relations 
with the majority of the countries of East Asia, including not only Japan, but 
also China, Taiwan, South Korea, and most of Southeast Asia. 
These complexities make it inevitable that this lecture be somewhat super- 
ficial and simplistic. Nonetheless, it is intended to provide a broad overview 
of the major American objectives in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of 
World War 11, and the evolving American strategies in pursuing those goals. 
American policy in East Asia over the last forty years has revolved around 
four principal interests, which have given a degree of continuity to American 
relations with the region, These include: 
1) an interest in maintaining a stable balance of power in the region as a 
whole and, more particularly, in containing the expansion of the Soviet 
Union; 
2) a related interest in ensuring peace and stability in a number of local 
disputes in the region, especially those involving the Korean peninsula, 
Taiwan, and Indochina; 
3) an interest in the economic prosperity of the region, and in promoting 
mutually beneficial economic relations between the Asia-Pacific econ- 
omies and that of the United States; 
4) an interest in encouraging progress toward political liberalization and 
institutionalization in the dynamic states of the region. 
After reviewing these four goals, and the changing strategies employed to 
achieve them, I want to look forward a bit, to suggest the new challenges and 
opportunities facing the United States in East Asia as we gradually enter what 
I believe will be a new era in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Containing the Soviet Union 
From a strategic perspective, containment of the Soviet Union, which can be 
defined as maintaining a favorable global balance of power relative to the 
Soviet Union, has been the central component of American foreign policy 
throughout the world since the late 1940s. Ironically, this strategy was applied 
to Asia only in an indirect sense during most of the postwar period. Until the 
late 1960s, the Soviet Union devoted relatively little of its diplomatic and 
military resources to the Asian-Pacific region. As a result, American 
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containment strategies in the region focussed not so much on the Soviet 
Union itself, as on those Communist nations that were regarded in 
Washington as extensions of Soviet influence: North Korea, China, and 
North Vietnam. 
Since the late 1960s, however, the Asia-Pacific region has witnessed a vast 
expansion of Soviet military power. The build-up began, to be sure, largely as 
a response to the intensification of the Sino-Soviet border dispute, but it soon 
became linked to Moscow's global competition with the United States as 
well. The growth of Soviet forces in the Far East has now developed to the 
point that around one-third of the Soviet naval and air forces, and about one- 
quarter of its ground forces, are stationed in East Asia, and are equipped with 
some of the most modem equipment that Moscow's arsenals can provide. 
The Soviet Union has taken over the former American base in Cam Ranh Bay 
in Vietnam, and has even enlarged it considerably. The increasing scale and 
sophistication of Soviet military exercises, and particularly the use of Soviet 
forces in Afghanistan since 1980 and against the ill-fated Korean airliner in 
1983, have demonstrated that Moscow is prepared to employ its new military 
resources in the Asia-Pacific region in the pursuit of its national objec- 
tives. 
Although the quantitative dimension of the Soviet military build-up is 
widely accepted, there is considerable debate in the United States over its 
goal and missions. Virtually all analysts agree that Soviet forces are intended 
to undertake important defensive and deterrent assignments: to defend 
Siberia against any Chinese incursion, to deter Peking against any large-scale 
military action against Vietnam, to deploy a strategic nuclear submarine force 
from Vladivostok and Petropavlask, and to defend those bases against any 
American attack. Further, the expansion of Soviet military forces is clearly 
defined to establish Moscow as a major regional power, and thus to 
compensate for the Kremlin's present lack of effective economic, diplomatic, 
or cultural resources in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Beyond this, some analysts believe that there are additional offensive 
motivations behind the Soviet military build-up. It is not considered likely 
that the Soviet Union would choose to launch a major conflict in the Asia- 
Pacific region. Should a conventional global war begin elsewhere, however, 
the Soviet Union might decide to use its forces in the Far East to seize parts of 
China or Japan, in part to ensure its own defence, and partially to obtain 
leverage in any negotiations to end the conflict. The Soviet Union might also 
wish to interdict the sea lines of communication between Japan and the 
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Middle East or between Japan and the United States, or to attack American 
military installations in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The American response to recent Soviet military deployments has 
contained three main components. First, the United States has provided its 
own forces in the Pacific with improved weapons: F-16s, Tomahawk cruise 
missiles, Trident submarines, a seventh aircraft carrier task force, and new 
frigates and destroyer escorts. Under its former Secretary, John Lehman, the 
Department of the Navy began developing a strategy of "horizontal 
escalation", under which naval task forces could undertake counter-offensive 
operations against vulnerable areas of the Soviet Union in the event of a 
general war. The Northwest Pacific, and particularly the so-called "ocean 
bastionff of the Sea of Okhotsk, was widely regarded as one of the areas in 
which this "maritime strategy" would most likely be applied. 
Second, the United States has attempted to strengthen its strategic 
cooperation with other friendly countries in the region. For example, the 
United States is now engaged with China in regular consultation and 
dialogue on regional issues, sharing of intelligence, exchanges of military 
personnel, and limited sales of defensive military equipment. The recent visit 
by an American naval flotilla to Qingdao, and the subsequent performance in 
China by the precision flying team of the American air force, symbolize the 
growing ties between the military establishments of the two countries. In the 
case of Japan, Washington and Tokyo now undertake more detailed and 
comprehensive coordination of their national defence strategies, conduct 
larger .and more effective joint military exercises, and cooperate in the 
development of certain types of military technology. 
To a degree, these developments reflect an American effort to shift part of 
the burden of regional security to some of the more prosperous countries in 
the area that can well afford to bear it. We have encouraged the Japanese to 
spend more money on, and to assume a greater responsibility for, their own 
defence. There are indications that a similar policy will be undertaken toward 
South Korea in a few years' time. In neither case, however, is the United 
States proposing to abandon its treaty commitments to its partner, or to force 
it to accept complete responsibility for its own security. Rathet, it is 
attempting to allocate the burdens of regional security more rationally, at a 
time when American economic preeminence is waning, and when other 
parts of the world compete for American attention and resources. 
Third, the United States has successfully engaged in negotiations with the 
Soviet Union to limit the number of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) 
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deployed in East Asia, as well as those stationed in Europe. At every stage, 
Washington took into account the interests of its allies in Tokyo and Peking. 
When the negotiations began, Washington insisted that any Soviet SS-20s 
removed from Europe as the result of an INF agreement be detroyed, rather 
than redeployed to East Asia. Later, the United States resisted a formula that 
would have allowed the two superpowers to retain one hundred INF 
warheads in the Asia-Pacific region, while removing all such weapons from 
the European theater. Instead, Washington won Soviet acceptance of a global 
"double-zero" formula, under which all INF systems, in both Europe and 
Asia, will be dismantled. It is not inconceivable that the two superpowers will 
also undertake further negotiations on conventional arms control and 
confidence building measures in the Asia-Pacific region. 
This tripartite strategy has introduced some strains into America's 
relations with some friendly Asian countries. Not all Asian nations share the 
same perceptions of the Soviet threat as the United States. Some, particularly 
those distant from the Soviet Union, take a less alarmist view of Moscow's 
capabilities and intentions than is common in Washington; others, 
particularly in Southeast Asia, are more concerned with the long-run threat 
from China or Japan than with the immediate challenge of the Soviet Union. 
As a result, there is a widespread and understandable concern that the 
United States, in its attempt to "share the burden" with others, will promote a 
level of armament in China or Japan that will later have destabilizing 
consequences for the rest of the region. 
In addition, there has been growing apprehension among some American 
allies that they risk preemptive or retalitatory action from the Soviet Union if 
they maintain a security relationship with the United States. Relatedly, there 
is also worry about the implications of the arms race that the two 
superpowers have been conducting in the Northwest Pacific over the last 
decade. Together, these concerns have produced a growing nuclear allergy 
in the area, and a desire for insulation from the strategic competition between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. These sentiments can be seen most 
plainly in New Zealand, whose government has prohibited nuclear-armed 
or nuclear-powered American vessels from entering the country's ports, and 
which has therefore seen its alliance with the United States effectively 
suspended. But similar views can also be heard in some quarters in the South 
Pacific and Southeast Asia (where there is continuing pressure for the 
creation of subregional nuclear-free zones), and in the Philippines, Japan, 
and even South Korea (where there is concern that the presence of American 
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bases makes those countries likely targets for Soviet attack in the event d a 
general war). 
Moreover, the United States now faces in Mikhail Gorbachev a more 
flexible adversary than in the past. It is clear that Gorbachev assigns a much 
higher priority to Soviet relations with East Asia than did his predecessors, 
and that he is aware that the Kremlin's nearly exclusive emphasis on the 
development of its military power has alienated the Soviet Union from the 
majority of the countries in the region. Since his major speech on Asian 
issues in Vladivostok in July 1986, therefore, Gorbachev has made some 
substantive overtures toward China, has avidly courted the North Koreans, 
and has adopted a more subtle and flexible strategy toward Japan and the 
non-Communist states of Southeast Asia. Some Soviet allies, notably Laos 
and Mongolia, have also been encouraged to engage in similar ddmauches to 
former adversaries. The Kremlin has identified some of the issues on which 
the United States is most vulnerable - including the strains in its economic 
relations with several Asian countries, the nuclear allergy mentioned above, 
and the concern about the naval arms race in the region - and is attempting to 
find ways of capitalizing on them. 
All this implies that the United States, too, will have to be more flexible and 
sophisticated in its Asian strategy. No longer can it count on Soviet 
indifference or insensitivity. No longer can it assume that its security 
relations with the rest of the region will rest on a solid and mutually 
satisfactory economic base. Increasingly, Washington will have to devise 
common strategic perceptions and policies through dialogue and consulta- 
tion with its friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific region, rather than by 
attempting to impose them unilaterally. 
Regional disputes 
Ever since 1950, the United States has had a continuing involvement in three 
local disputes in the Asia-Pacific region: Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina. In 
each case, we have employed military force to help protect the non- 
Communist territory with which we have been allied from its communist 
neighbor: we helped defend South Korea against the North in 1950, 
participated in two crises over the Chinese offshore islands in 1954-55 and 
1958, and engaged in a costly and protracted war in Vietnam between 1964 
and 1975. Moreover, the United States maintains an interest in all three of 
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these conflicts. We have a mutual defence treaty with South Korea, and have 
40.000 troops stationed there. Although we have normalized our relations 
with China, we have frenquently reiterated our interest in a peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan question, and continue to sell a limited amount of 
defensive weapons to Taipei. Finally, even though the Southeast Asian 
Treaty Organization is no longer in operation, we retain our treaty 
commitments to the security of Thailand, and have consistently expressed 
our opposition to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. 
Compared with the past, however, and as a direct result of our tragic 
involvement in Vietnam, the extent of our commitment has been drastically 
reduced in two of the three cases. In late 1978, when the United States 
established normal diplomatic relations with Peking we simultaneously 
announced the withdrawal of our remaining military forces from Taiwan and 
the termination of our mutual security treaty with the island. Four years later, 
in August 1982, we reached an agreement with Peking that we would 
gradually reduce the quantity of weapons sold to Taiwan, and would not 
exceed the quality of the arms that were provided to Taipei at the time of the 
normalization of Sino-American relations. Our role in the conflict in Cam- 
bodia is even more indirect. Although we give the Democratic Kampuchean 
coalition our firm diplomatic support, there are no American forces or 
advisers involved in the fighting and the United States provides only a small 
amount of financial and material aid to the struggle against the Vietnamese 
and their clients in Phnom Penh. 
Only in South Korea is the United States still involved in a sizeable and 
direct fashion in a regional conflict in East Asia. Even there, however, the 
number of American troops is now considerably less than it was fifteen years 
ago. Moreover, as has already been indicated, it is highly likely that Seoul will 
be asked to make a greater financial contribution to defray American 
expenses, and even that the level of American deployment will further 
decline as South Korea's strength and prosperity grows. 
Of equal importance is the change in the nature of American participation 
in the processes of tension reduction and conflict resolution in all these 
disputes. In the past, the United States was centrally involved in the 
Panmunjom negotiations along the demilitarized zone in Korea, in the 
Geneva-Warsaw talks over a renunciation of force in the Taiwan Straits, and 
in the Paris negotiations over the end of the conflict in Vietnam. In all cases, 
moreover, Washington dominated the negotiating agenda, with our allies 
either taking a relatively minor role in the discussions (as in the case of South 
Korea and Vietnam), or absent from the table altogether (as in the case of 
Taiwan). Today, in contrast, the United States has placed its emphasis on 
facilitating a process of negotiation and dialogue between the parties 
immediately concerned, with Washington taking a secondary but reinforcing 
role. 
Thus, with regard to Taiwan, the United States has consistently repeated 
ever since signing the Shanghai Communiquk in 1972 that the Taiwan 
question can only be resolved by the Chinese themselves. As Secretary of 
State George Shultz pointed out in his visit to Shanghai in 1987, the United 
States hopes to create an environment that will foster contacts between the 
two sides, and welcomes the growing economic, academic, and humanitar- 
ian ties across the Taiwan Straits. Indeed, a good deal of the communication 
between the scholarly communities of Taiwan and the Mainland occurs in 
universities and research institutions in the United States. At the same time, 
however, Washington has also reiterated that it wiU not serve as a mediator or 
an intermediary in the dialogue, nor will it endorse either party's negotiating 
position. Instead, we believe that a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue 
can only come through a natural process of convergence and dialogue 
between Taipei and Peking. 
In Korea the United States also places its emphasis on a direct North-South 
dialogue over such specific issues as the reunification of divided families, the 
expansion of economic and cultural exchanges between the two sides, and 
the development of effective confidence-building mechanisms along the 
demilitarized zone. The United States is willing to forge contacts with North 
Korean diplomats and scholars and, under appropriate circumstances, 
develop economic relations with Pyongyang. We also hope that the Soviet 
Union and China will develop similar ties with South Korea. Over the longer 
term, the United States could even contemplate a quadripartite international 
conference, including representatives from the United States and China, as 
well as from both Koreas, to discuss the Korean question. But we believe that 
it ultimately will be the direct North-South dialogue, not any international 
negotiations or contacts, that will be the key to a meaningful reduction of 
tension on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, we have made it clear that the 
United States will improve its relations with North Korea only on the basis of 
progress in the dialogue between Pyongyang and Seoul. 
Similarly, Washington encourages the Association of Southeast Asian 
Countries (ASEAN) and the Cambodian resistance to take the lead in 
defining a strategy for negotiations with Hanoi and Phnom Penh for the 
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removal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. The United States hopes to 
help create an environment that will encourage Hanoi to moderate its 
ambitions in Indochina. Accordingly, we provide diplomatic and material 
support to the Democratic Kampuchean resistance, maintain our security 
treaty with Thailand, and engage in regular consultations with ASEAN and 
China over a common strategy toward Cambodia. But we do not believe that 
a more direct form of American involvement would be conducive to an 
effective solution of the Cambodian problem, or would secure the support of 
the American people. 
Thus, as it has for more than thirty-five years, the United States retains an 
interest in the regional disputes in Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina. But the 
American participation has in most cases become less direct, and focuses on 
fostering a climate in which the parties directly concerned can work out their 
solutions through dialogue and negotiation. The United States increasingly 
recognizes that the strategy for managing and resolving regional disputes 
must come from the inside out, not from the outside in. We believe that such 
an approach is more effective and sustainable thm a more direct American 
involvement. Even so, we must also recognize that none of the three disputes 
in question has yet secured a final resolution. 
Political liberalization 
Idealism has long been an important feature of American foreign policy. The 
United States is, after all, a society born more than two hundred years ago 
through a violent revolution against a colonial power. Like many post- 
revolutionary societies, Americans have been convinced of the attractiveness 
of the values and institutions that guided their revolutionary struggle, and 
have often sought to export their vision of a just society to other nations. 
In postwar Asia, this aspect of American policy has passed through three 
stages. For the first thirty years following the conclusion of World War I., 
until the beginning of the Carter Administration, American idealism took the 
form of vigorous anti-Communism. The United States placed itself in 
opposition to the emergence of Communist systems throughout the region, 
whether essentially indigenous (as in China and North Vietnam), or 
exported by force (as on the Korean peninsula, South Vietnam, or elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia). Unfortunately, whether in South Korea, the Philippines, 
or South Vietnam, this formula often led the United States to support 
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authoritarian regimes which declared themselves to be pro-Western and 
anti-Communist, and to exped or demand little in the way of political 
liberalization. 
During the Carter Administration, the shortcomings of earlier policies led 
to a marked change in emphasis. The United States adopted the goal of 
protecting and fostering human rights in a wide range of countries, from the 
totalitarian regimes of the Communist bloc to the authoritarian systems allied 
with the West. The focus was largely, although not exclusively, on the fate of 
individual dissidents and protest organizations. In the Asia-Pacific region, 
the most notable example of the orientation of the Carter Administration was 
its concern with the fate of Kim Dae-jung following his kidnapping from 
Japan and his forcible return to South Korea. 
The Reagan Administration has not abandoned its predecessor's concern 
with human rights, but has taken a more systemic approach to the problem. 
Although it did secure the release of Kim Dae-jung in early 1981, it has paid 
less attention to the fate of individual dissidents, and has placed greater 
emphasis on encouraging the peaceful and orderly evolution of Asian 
political systems in the direction of greater liberalization. Thus, the Reagan 
Administration has encouraged constitutional reform and a peaceful 
transition of power in South Korea, the relaxation of political restrictions in 
Taiwan, and fair and free elections at the end of the Marcos era in the 
Philippines. 
This policy has scored some notable successes. The United States eased 
the removal of Ferdinand Marcos from the presidency of the Philippines, 
and arranged for a comfortable exile in Hawaii. American encouragement 
has helped promote a significant degree of liberalization in Taiwan, with the 
cancellation of martial law and the end of the legal prohibition on the 
formation of opposition political parties. In South Korea, pressure from 
Washington was also instrumental in persuading Chun Doo-hwan to agree 
to step down at the end of his seven-year term, and in convincing Roh Tae- 
woo to accept the opposition's demand for direct presidential elections at the 
end of 1987. 
Still, the political situation in all three countries remains fragde. Corazon 
Aquino has proven less effective as president of the Philippines than she was 
as leader of the anti-Marcos opposition, and is making only gradual progress 
in her efforts to gain the support of the military and to subdue the 
Communist insurrection. In South Korea, the elections of late 1987 and early 
1988 produced a sharp cleavage between the executive branch controlled by 
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the Democratic Justice Party, and the National Assembly, controlled by the 
opposition. Moreover, violent student protests against the government and 
against the large American presence in the country continue. On Taiwan, the 
opposition Democratic Progressive Party has flirted with the concepts of 
independence and self-determination for the island, and has intensified its 
calls for a more rapid reform of the country's anachronistic political system. 
All these developments suggest that the United States will now have to cope 
with the problems that inevitably arise in authoritarian systems after they 
have embarked on a course of liberalization and reform. Jncreasingly, the 
issue for America may be less how to cope with brutal tyrants than how to 
deal with ineffective democrats. 
Moreover, the United States has not yet defined a clear policy for 
promoting political liberalization in friendly Communist countries, such as 
China. The recent visit of the Dalai Lama, and the subsequent riots in Tibet, 
dramatically revealed the differences between the Reagan Administration 
and the Congress over the strategy to take toward the question of human 
rights in China. The Administration's position was that the situation in China 
is generally improving, and that any overt American pressure would be 
ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. Many in Congress, in 
contrast, insisted that the Chinese record on human rights is not yet 
satisfactory, and maintained that Peking should be subjected to the same 
pressure as are other friendly Asian nations. This debate revealed, once 
again, one of the fundamental dilemmas about the idealistic impulse in 
American foreign policy: it is virtually impossible to apply general values and 
principles in international relations in a proportionate and consistent way. 
Often, it is the weaker allies of the United States, as well as its most committed 
adversaries, that are the target of American pressure for political reform, 
while powerful nations that Washington is seeking to cultivate may be 
relatively immune from criticism. 
Economic relations 
The fourth constant element in American policy towards East Asia since 
World War I1 has been the desire to promote the economic prosperity of the 
region, and to build mutually beneficial relations between American and 
Asian markets. For most of the postwar era, the United States contributed to 
the development of East Asian economies by aiding friendly nations with 
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their security requirements, providing economic and technical assistance, 
facilitating direct Amelrican foreign 'mvestment in the Asia-Pacific region, 
and, above all, by maintaining a relatively open American market that could 
absorb the output of the dynamic export-oriented economies of the 
region. 
There has been in recent years a fundamental transformation of the 
character of the American economy and in the pattern of its interactions with 
the Asia-Pacific region. The basic problem in the United States has been that 
consumption has exceeded output, investment has exceeded savings, and 
government expenditures have exceeded government revenues. The result 
has been a massive inflow of both foreign goods (to satisfy the excess 
demand for consumption) and foreign capital (to make up for the shortage of 
domestic savings and taxes). The inflow of foreign merchandise and finance 
has been expressed in mounting trade deficits, amounting to nearly $ 170 
billion in 1986, Moreover, in recent years, the United States has experienced 
trade imbalances not only with Japan, but also with virtually every other 
country in East Asia, including some with whom it has traditionally run trade 
surpluses. Indeed, our trade deficits with the Asia-Pacific region now 
constitute more than half of our national total. 
The imbalance in the American current accounts has stimulated a series of 
responses over time, each of which has tended to supplement, rather than 
completely to supersede, earlier approaches. First, there has been classic 
protectionism. whether expressed in quotas on textiles, "orderly marketing 
agreements" on automobiles or electronic equipment, proposals for local 
content requirements or the calls for punitive tariffs against those countries 
that do not reduce their "unreasonable" trade surpluses with the United 
States. 
Second, the United States has engaged in what might be described as 
oflmsive liberalization: using the negotiating power of the American govern- 
ment to open foreign markets to American goods or to gain protection for 
American intellectual property. Examples include the negotiations with 
Japan over the export of American automobile parts, telephonic equipment, 
and construction services; with South Korea over insurance and the 
protection of patents for chemical production processes; and with Taiwan 
over the export of American beer, tobacco, and poultry. Like classic 
protectionism, offensive liberalization may involve the imposition of 
retaliatory measures against foreign trading partners if negotiations do not 
achieve the desired results, but its aim is more to open overseas markets to 
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American exports rather than to close American markets to foreign 
products. 
Most recently, the Reagan Administration has attempted to employ a 
policy of negotiated stvuctural adjustment. This strategy involves efforts, again 
through bilateral negotiations, to reduce the trade imbalance by securing 
changes in the macroeconomic policies of major American trading partners. 
Thus, Washington has placed considerable pressure on Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan to revalue their currencies relative to the dollar, and has 
encouraged Japan to stimulate domestic demand so as to increase internal 
consumption of Japanese goods and to expand the market for foreign 
imports. Indeed, the United States has also begun discussions with Tokyo to 
encourage greater construction of housing, as a way of absorbing the excess 
domestic savings which are regarded as one of the fundamental causes of 
Japan's massive and chronic trade surpluses. 
The severity of the American economic problem, and the priority assigned 
by the United States government to combatting them, has placed economic 
issues on the top of the agenda in American relations with virtually every 
nation in the Asia-Pacific region. The result has been considerable 
resentment on the part of American trading partners in East Asia. In part this 
is because the open American markets to which most nations had become 
accustomed are now closing somewhat due to the sluggish pace of economic 
growth and the rise of protectionist sentiment in the United States. In part, 
too, the economic tensions between America and its Asian trading partners 
are due to the widespread and correct perception that the United States has 
been slow to address that part of the problem for which it bears the principal 
responsibility: the slow growth in domestic productivity and the chronic 
deficits in the budget of the American government. In addition, as the United 
States begins to experiment with the strategies which above have been 
described as offensive liberalization and structural adjustment, it will begin 
to press its trading partners to alter the character of their domestic economies 
in ways that will predictably be interpreted as American interference in other 
nations' internal affairs. 
Unless the Reagan Administration can, in its waning months, find the 
political will to address these underlying difficulties more effectively, or 
unless that task can be undertaken quickly by the new administration that 
will take power in January 1989, the prospects are for continuing tensions 
between the United States and the nations of the Asia-Pacific region over 
economic issues. Moreover, as the collapse of the American stock markets in 
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October 1987 demonstrated, there is still the danger of a recession in the 
United States that would have the most serious implications for the export- 
oriented economies of East Asia that are still dependent on the American 
marketplace for their prosperity and growth. 
Conclusion 
This review of the past forty years has suggested the signthcant changes in 
the strategies by which the United States has pursued its major objectives in 
the Asia-Pacific region. The containment of Soviet allies has been replaced by 
the more direct containment of the Soviet Union itself. American 
involvement in regional disputes in Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina has 
become less direct, with Washington now emphasizing the importance of 
dialogue and negotiation among the parties immediately concerned, The 
idealistic component in American policy toward East Asia has been 
transformed from mere anti-Communism to a broader interest in human 
rights, and from a focus on political dissidents to a concern with the general 
process of political liberalization. And the sluggish growth of the American 
economy has led to a resurgence of economic nationalism in the United 
States, and experimentation with different strategies for remedying the 
chronic trade deficits which the United States has experienced for the past 
several years. 
Beyond these changes, three further transformations in American strategy 
toward East Asia require at least a brief mention. First, there has been a 
change in the relative importance of the enduring American goals and 
objectives in the Asia-Pacific region. Although the United States retains its 
traditional interests in maintaining an effective balance of power against the 
Soviet Union, in deterring the outbreak or escalation of conflict in the 
regional disputes in which it has been involved, and in promoting political 
liberalization throughout the region, it is now economic issues that tend to 
dominate American policy toward East Asia as a whole, as well as toward 
particular countries within the Asia-Pacific region. 
Second, with the extraordinary economic dynamism of the East Asian 
economies, and with the growing emphasis paid to the Far East in Soviet 
foreign policy, it is increasingly apparent that the Asia-Pacific region is now, 
along with Europe, one of the two central foci of American foreign policy. 
This is not to say that East Asia has now gained primacy over Europe in the 
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eyes of American policyrnakers, nor that it is likely to do so in the near future. 
The strategic competition between the Soviet Union and the United States 
remains focussed in Europe, and the European Community contains several 
of the most important actors in the global economy. But it is true that 
American foreign policy can no longer be characterized by an Atlantic bias. 
Instead, it must give at least equal weight to the concerns of the Asia-Pacific 
nations as well. 
Finally, one is struck by the gradual decline of Europe as a factor in 
American policy toward East Asia. In the immediate postwar period, 
European nations played a signhcant role in shaping American relations 
with the Asia-Pacific region. The views of Great Britain were influential, 
although not always determinant, in the consideration of American policy 
toward China and Taiwan. French policy played its role in shaping the 
American involvement in Indochina. Today, however, the United States 
chooses its policy toward East Asia without significant regard to the views of 
its European allies, if only because they have long since ceased to be 
significant actors in the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, 
the evolution of the Soviet-American negotiations over the reduction of 
intermediate-range nuclear forces suggests that Asia may now influence 
American policy toward Europe more than the reverse. 
Looking ahead, it is now possible to foresee the gradual end of the postwar 
era, characterized as it was by American dominance of the world economy 
and the bipolar character of the global strategic balance. In its place is slowly 
emerging a new international system, that will most likely include a more 
multipolar structure in both the global economy and in international strategic 
matters. In the past, such a transformation from one international system to 
another was usually marked by a global war. Fortunately, the balance of 
nuclear terror virtually guarantees that the coming change in the inter- 
national system will occur through a more peaceful and more protracted 
process. The transformation will not take place in any single cataclysmic 
event, but rather through the cumulative impact of more subtle but equally 
significant changes. In retrospect, we may well conclude that we have already 
witnessed several of them, including China's declaration of an independent 
foreign policy in 1982, Gorbachev's rise to power in the Soviet Union in 
1985, the emergence of the United States as a net debtor nation in 1986-87, 
and the Japanese decision to expand its defence spending beyond one 
percent of its GNP in 1987. 
These developments present the United States with at least three major 
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challenges and opportunities in the Asia-Pacific region over the rest of the 
century and beyond. First, the growing intensity and complexity of economic 
relations in East Asia has created a need for greater consultation and 
coordination in economic matters. The era of American dominance of the 
global and regional economy is over, but no other nation, not even Japan, is 
rising to take the place of the United States. Nor is it likely that the nations of 
the Asia-Pacific region, given the diversity of their economic and political 
systems, can create a formal Pacific Community, comparable to that which 
his been developed in Western Europe. Instead, the challenge will be for the 
United States and Japan to cooperate in maintaining an open and prosperous 
East Asian regional economy, with other strong economies increasingly 
involved in making key decisions. 
Second, the greater strategic multipolarity of the region will also create a 
need for a more complex American military and diplomatic strategy in East 
Asia. In the past, American strategy was based on the assumption of a bipolar 
world, in which a single adversary, the Soviet Union, posed the principal 
threat to the security of the region, and where the best approach for coping 
with Soviet expansion was to increase the military power of all those who 
might be willing to cooperate in containing it, In contrast, a multipolar 
approach to Asia would imply that other countries than the Soviet Union, 
such as China and Japan, might well be destabilizing forces in the future, and 
that a sudden and significant increase in the power of any nation in the region 
might well be disruptive to the balance of power. Relatedly, while a bipolar 
view of Asia would suggest the maintenance of a network of anti-Soviet 
alliances, a multipolar approach to the region is more likely to entail a 
complex and shifting pattern of informal, temporary alignments rather than 
permanent security obligations. 
Finally, the economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region may well be a 
major catalyst for reform in a number of Communist systems. Already, China 
has embarked on what Deng Xiaoping has described as its second 
Communist revolution, broadening the range of its foreign economic 
relationships, increasing the role of market forces and individual initiative in 
its domestic economy, and taking an active role in most major international 
economic institutions. At the same time, the priority that Peking now assigns 
to economic modernization and reform has been accompanied by a 
si@cant reorientation of its foreign policy, in the direction of increased 
pragmatism, more flexibility, and a greater desire for peaceful relations with 
most of its Asian neighbors. 
Copenhagen Papers 288 96 
The American Strategy in the Far East 
Signs of change are now evident in other Asian Communist nations as 
well. Vietnam and Mongolia are already experimenting with limited forms of 
economic restructuring, and it is at least conceivable that North Korea will 
follow a similar course after the death of Kim 11-song. Most importantly, the 
Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev now appears committed to a 
program of perestroika that may ultimately rival that of the Chinese. This raises 
the possibility of integrating the Soviet Union more fully into the Asia-Pacific 
economy, and, even more, the possibility that the Soviet Union will reorient 
its foreign policy in ways similar to those undertaken by Peking. It also 
suggests that Vietnam and North Korea may be persuaded to adopt a more 
conciliatory posture toward their neighbors. Seizing these opportunities in a 
responsible manner, with full awareness of the uncertainties that accompany 
them, will be one of the most important tasks for the United States and its 
friends in East Asia as we approach the twenty-first century. 
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